When Power Becomes a Burden: Cyclic Patterns of Crisis, Delegitimation, and Elite Exodus

Introduction

In the history of major social crises—wars, economic collapses, and political breakdowns—a recurring pattern emerges: the search for a “culprit” to swiftly diffuse systemic tension. This “scapegoating” mechanism does not explain the root causes of a crisis; instead, it stabilises the existing order by projecting guilt onto visible and vulnerable groups. The historical persecution of Jewish communities represents one of the most striking examples of this pattern, but it is by no means unique. Such instances reveal a persistent link between crisis, political opportunism, and the redistribution of power and resources.

I. The Historical Pattern of Persecution and Scapegoating

Throughout the Middle Ages, the early modern period, and into the contemporary era, the persecution of Jews frequently coincided with periods of deep social upheaval. Although ideological justifications remained dominant, the actual motivations were pragmatic: fiscal, political, or social.

In England (1290), King Edward I expelled the Jewish community (roughly 3,000 to 4,000 people), effectively erasing the nobility’s debts to Jewish moneylenders. In France (1182, 1306, 1394), repeated expulsions under Philip II and Philip IV were accompanied by property confiscations and the annulment of debts. During the Black Death (1348–1351), Jews in the German lands were accused of poisoning wells, leading to mass pogroms and the annihilation of entire communities.

The expulsions from Spain (1492) and Portugal (1496–1497) introduced the dimension of creating religiously homogenous states, but they were equally driven by political and dynastic motives. In Habsburg Austria (1670), and later in the Russian Empire (1881–1920), persecutions and pogroms were bound up with economic crises, populist mobilisation, and the unraveling of the institutional order. During the Russian Civil War (1918–1921), this violence escalated dramatically amid the broader conditions of war and chaos.

The culmination of this pattern was the Holocaust (1933–1945), serving as an extreme form of ideologically structured and systematic violence.

Viewed as a whole, these historical examples point to the same structural mechanism: in moments of crisis, societies often combine ideological stigmatisation with concrete interests—financial, political, or social—thereby generating cycles of persecution and migration.

II. Karl Marx and C. Wright Mills: The Concept of Alienated Power Elites

In 1848, Karl Marx published his essay On the Jewish Question (Zur Judenfrage),$^1$ polemicising with Bruno Bauer on the relationship between religion and the liberal state. In this text, Marx clarifies the distinction between formal political emancipation and actual human freedom, condensing his argument into four core theses:

1. Political and human emancipation are not identical—a state can be secular while society remains religious;

2. The secular state does not abolish religion, but rather displaces it into the private sphere;

3. The liberal “rights of man” primarily protect the isolated, egoistic individual;

4. The dominance of money in liberal society represents a form of alienated power that transcends individuals.

This final thesis opens up a broader theoretical horizon. Just as Marx views religion as a form of alienated consciousness, he sees the market logic of money as a form of alienated social rationality (which he metaphorically terms “Judaism”). Liberal society does not abolish these forms; it institutionalises them—relegating them to the sphere of egoistic interests while simultaneously granting them legal protection and social legitimacy.

Within this expanded framework, Marx’s analysis converges with C. Wright Mills’ insights regarding the concentration of power.$^2$ The relations that produce inequality and domination do not remain abstract; they condense within decision-making structures—specifically within the elites who manage key segments of the economy, social structures, and institutions. This gives rise to the concept of alienated power elites—actors who do not merely participate in these relations, but actively produce, legitimize, and amplify them.

Alienation, therefore, is not confined solely to economics and politics; it encompasses the ideological sphere as well: the production of norms, values, and a baseline of “normality” that stabilises the existing order and deepens domination (Gramsci).$^3$ Society does not function through structures alone, but through the selection and normalisation of behaviour—a process in which elites play a pivotal role. Consequently, society is a space where alienation is not just maintained, but actively organised and generated through interconnected economic, political, and ideological (symbolic) mechanisms. In this sense, it can be argued that alienated power elites today represent the most institutionally concentrated form of alienation within modern liberal society.

III. The Cyclical Nature of History

Within the philosophy of history, a prominent school of thought views historical progression as a series of lifecycles belonging to major historical formations (civilisations, cultures, religions, ideologies). Instead of linear progress (as seen in Hegel), this perspective is dominated by the idea of cyclical or plural development, where multiple civilisations coexist, each governed by its own internal logic and laws.

Giambattista Vico, in his New Science (Scienza Nuova),$^4$ was the first to systematically introduce the idea of historical cycles, though the concept found its most famous formulation in Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West ($*Der Untergang des Abendlandes*$).$^5$ Spengler argued that civilisations are organic entities with their own lifecycle, moving inexorably from birth to decay. A similar, more analytically rigorous approach was developed by Arnold J. Toynbee,$^6$ who explained the evolution of civilisations through the dynamics of “challenge and response.” The Russian sociologist Pitirim Sorokin$^7$ emphasised the alternation of cultural types—moving from the ideational to the sensate—as the primary driver of historical change.

What these approaches share is the conviction that history is shaped by repeating patterns: ascent, peak, crisis, and decline. The defining factors are not merely economic, but cultural—deeply tied to religion, symbolism, and the “spirit” of a civilisation. Crisis is not treated as an anomaly, but as a necessary phase of development—what Spengler called the “winter of a civilisation.” Accordingly, if a specific historical subject exhibits recognisable behavioural patterns over time, those patterns become part of its historical character. A cyclical perspective thus allows us to view past patterns not merely as closed episodes, but as indicators of potential future trajectories.

IV. Will History Repeat Itself? The Crisis of Elites and the Contemporary Context

In theories of historical cyclicality, the late phases of a civilisation are characterised by a transformation of its elites, who become alienated from both their social base and the institutions they govern. Spengler speaks of phases of isolation and petrification, while Toynbee describes a process wherein a creative minority degenerates into a dominant minority whose primary objective is the preservation of its own power. In this stage, the crisis does not merely spark a confrontation between society and the alienated elites; it triggers conflict within the elites themselves. Alienated power elites do not form a monolithic structure; they represent a fragmented field where different segments respond differently to systemic crisis, frequently clashing over the control of resources, institutions, and narratives. The unity of the elite dissolves into factional warfare.

In theory, following the spirit of C. Wright Mills,$^8$ a broad distinction can be made between “state-bound” elites (political, security, and military structures) and more mobile, “transnational” elites (economic and cultural actors). Historical patterns suggest that in conflicts between these groups—or during fragmentation within state-bound structures—mobile and transnational actors are more likely to become targets of delegitimation, as they are simultaneously highly visible, highly influential, and politically vulnerable.

During this process, complex economic and cultural dynamics are translated into moral and identity-based categories. History demonstrates (as seen in the repeated expulsions of Jewish populations) that the selection of a “scapegoat” does not follow the line of greatest alienated power (Marx), but rather the line of power that lacks control over the apparatus of state coercion. The segments of the elite that retain institutional control consolidate their position, while the elimination or marginalisation of rival factions leads to the homogenisation of the remaining elites. Although such homogenisation may increase stability and control in the short term, over the long run it leads to systemic centralization and rigidity, drastically reducing the system’s capacity to adapt.

In the contemporary context, elite fragmentation is often described through the tensions playing out between various institutional and functional blocs: political, security-military, economic, and cultural-media structures (including universities). Within this framework, the term “deep state” designates stable networks within the state apparatus—specifically within the security and political blocs that possess long-term institutional continuity. Certain authors, such as Peter Turchin,$^9$ point to the phenomenon of “elite overproduction,” wherein a growing number of ambitious contenders intensifies competition, raising the probability of intra-elite conflict. Similar diagnoses regarding the structural tensions of the contemporary Western order can be found in the works of Jeffrey Sachs, John Mearsheimer, and Emmanuel Todd,$^{10}$ who look through different theoretical lenses to highlight the contradictions inherent in the Western global system.

V. A Thought Experiment: The Exodus of Elites and Systemic Transformation

Let us consider a thought experiment: a scenario in which a highly developed liberal society (for instance, the United States) enters a phase of deep economic insecurity, triggering a conflict between a broad social base and the reigning power elites. Under these conditions, domestic and foreign policy issues—including US-Israel relations or the influence of various lobbies and interest groups—become battlegrounds for defining the system’s legitimacy and future direction. Such a dynamic signals entry into a phase where the loss of broad social cohesion intersects with a crisis of legitimacy and institutional dysfunction, ultimately driving elite fragmentation and a transformation of the institutional order.

Similar patterns frequently manifest during deep crises: political stabilisation is sought by redirecting public discontent, accompanied by a political and economic reallocation of interests. As pressure from the populist base mounts, the elites begin to splinter into competing factions. In this showdown, the political-security elite (the “deep state”) typically serves as the primary arena of conflict, while the transnational elites—being the most visible and politically exposed—become targets of delegitimation and scapegoating. A significant portion of this elite (the bearers of knowledge, capital, and influence) leaves the country either forcibly or voluntarily (elite exit / brain drain). Meanwhile, the remaining domestic elites consolidate their grip on power, showing a strong tendency toward homogenisation via mandatory loyalty, the “normalisation” of political narratives, identity politics, elite self-isolation, and the centralization of power.

• New Destinations for the Elite: The decisive criteria for elite relocation are legal safety, institutional predictability, access to global markets, and an openness to highly educated migrants. In the contemporary world, these destinations are primarily Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia. China, as a destination, would hold appeal only within specific sectors boasting robust research capacities and aggressive industrial policies. However, stark differences in legal environments, political oversight, and academic autonomy would severely restrict any broader influx.

• Winners and Losers: The states that profited the most from elite migrations in the early modern era were Poland, the Ottoman Empire, and the Netherlands—all three because they welcomed the Jewish populations expelled by Western Europe. In different epochs, Amsterdam, Thessaloniki, and New York became the premier commercial hubs of the world. Similarly, the exodus of Jewish scientists, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs from Europe in the 1940s (particularly from Germany and Austria, constituting the largest brain drain in modern history) was a catalyst that transformed the United States from a regional power into the global epicenter of science and technology after World War II. The Holocaust was not only the greatest tragedy of modern history; it was also one of modern Germany’s most costly strategic blunders.

• Consequences: History suggests a clear pattern: short-term gains (property confiscation, debt cancellation, political homogenisation, and populist surges) are invariably paid for with long-term systemic losses in trade, expertise, economic dynamism, and technological innovation. Though the interplay of political and security structures can achieve short-term consolidation by eliminating rival factions, it yields a rigid, poorly adaptive system over the long term, hollowed out by the departure of its most mobile and highly educated strata.

• Loss of Global Primacy: While the effects might not be immediate, a steady loss of global primacy would become inevitable over time. Global power rests upon a combination of economic strength, military might, technological edge, and institutional attraction. The departure of a segment of the “transnational” elite directly undermines the final two pillars: innovation and institutional credibility. In the long run, this would mark the end of US dominance as a global leader, reducing it to a regional power within a multipolar world.

Conclusion

Although such a scenario remains highly improbable, this thought experiment yields a critical implication: extreme policies of persecution and forced homogenisation represent far more than a moral and political breakdown—they constitute explicit strategic self-sabotage. Societies that eliminate or drive out their most mobile and capable strata do not resolve their systemic crises; they deepen them, while simultaneously fortifying their geopolitical competitors. History teaches us that it does not unfold merely as a sequence of random events, but as a matrix of repeating patterns. Among these, one of the most striking remains the paradox of power: in their desperate attempt to preserve entrenched positions of control, societies frequently dismantle the very foundations that sustain them.

For P.U.L.S.E: Bojan Milić

Source P.U.L.S.E

References

Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. (Belgrade: Kultura / BIGZ / Karpos).

Marx, Karl. On the Jewish Question. In: Early Writings. (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1976).

Mills, C. Wright. The Power Elite. (Belgrade: Kultura, 1964).

Sorokin, Pitirim A. Social and Cultural Dynamics. (Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk, 2016).

Spengler, Oswald. The Decline of the West. 2 volumes. (Belgrade: Kosmos, 2025).

Todd, Emmanuel. After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order. (Belgrade: Clio, 2004).

Toynbee, Arnold J. A Study of History. Abridged edition. (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1970).

Turchin, Peter. Ages of Discord: A Structural-Demographic Analysis of American History. (Chaplin, CT: Beresta Books, 2016).

Vico, Giambattista. The New Science. (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1986).

$^1$ Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Early Writings (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1976).

$^2$ C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Belgrade: Kultura, 1964).

$^3$ Antonio Gramsci, Writings on Hegemony (Belgrade: Karpos, 2022).

$^4$ Giambattista Vico, The New Science (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1986).

$^5$ Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, 2 vols. (Belgrade: Kosmos, 2025).

$^6$ Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History I-II (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1970).

$^7$ Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk, 2016).

$^8$ Ibid.

$^9$ Peter Turchin, Ages of Discord: A Structural-Demographic Analysis of American History (Chaplin: Beresta Books, 2016).

$^{10}$ Emmanuel Todd, After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order (Belgrade: Clio, 2004).

  Bojan Milić, Elites, Philosophy, Society, Sociology